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Revisiting Racial Patents  
in an Era of Precision Medicine 
Jonathan Kahn, JD, PhD† 
In 2006, I published an article examining the rising use of racial 
categories in biomedical patents in the aftermath of the successful 
completion of the Human Genome Project and the production of the 
first draft of a complete human genome.1 Ten years on, it now seems 
time to revisit the issue and consider it in light of the current era of 
“Precision Medicine” so prominently promoted by President Obama in 
his 2015 State of the Union address where he announced a $215 million 
proposal for the Precision Medicine Initiative as “a bold new research 
effort to revolutionize how we improve health and treat disease.”2 
In both cases, my animating concern has been to explore how the 
legal system of patent protection may be playing an inadvertent, or at 
least underappreciated, role in validating—and in some cases 
promoting—the construction of racial categories as biological or genetic 
constructs. The patent system is a particularly powerful, if obscure, site 
for such constructions because it accords legal force to the constructions 
of race as a genetic phenomenon that shapes practices from the lab, to 
the manufacturing facility, to the doctor’s office, and to the market at 
large. 
We see this most clearly in the original case study that led me to 
this area of inquiry: the story of BiDil, the first drug ever approved by 
the FDA with a race-specific indication—to treat heart failure in a 
“black” patient.3 As I have shown, the underlying race-specific patent 
to BiDil drove how clinical trials were constructed, how data was 
framed and presented to the FDA and the public at large, and the way 
subsequent marketing programs attracted interest from doctors.4 All 
this is based on scientific data that actually shows the drug would work 
in people regardless of race—indeed, the patent holder himself stated 
 
†  James E. Kelley Professor of Law, Mitchell | Hamline School of Law. 
1. Jonathan D. Kahn, Patenting Race, 24 Nature Biotechnology 1349 
(2006). 
2. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: 
President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-
president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https://perma.cc/8MZ2-
C8D3].  
3. See Jonathan Kahn, Exploiting Race in Drug Development: BiDil’s Interim 
Model of Pharmacogenomics, 38 Soc. Stud. Sci. 737, 737–40 (2008) 
(discussing the background of BiDil). 
4. Id. at 740–44. 
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that he thought the drug would work in white people as well as black 
people.5 Yet due to the legal and commercial advantages conferred by 
a race-specific patent, the corporate sponsors of BiDil racialized the 
drug, and by implication, biologized race—all with the active collabor-
ation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the FDA.6 
This dynamic is problematic for a number of reasons, not least of 
which is that it is scientifically ungrounded. As I noted in my original 
article, an editorial in Nature Biotechnology nicely disposed of this issue 
by stating that: “Race is simply a poor proxy for the environmental 
and genetic causes of disease or drug response. . . . Pooling people in 
race silos is akin to zoologists grouping raccoons, tigers and okapis on 
the basis that they are all stripey.”7 Beyond this, the reification of race 
as genetic has historically been a basis for oppression and stigmati-
zation. Now more than ever, we must be on our guard against social, 
scientific, and legal practices that promote such misguided under-
standings. 
In my original article on patenting race, I used the PTO patent 
search engine to query whether the “claims” section of any patents or 
patent applications referenced any of the basic racial and ethnic cate-
gories of the U.S. census (and cognate terms, such as “Caucasian” and 
“European” for “White,” and “African” for “Black”) or used the terms 
“Race,” “Racial,” “Ethnic,” or “Ethnicity.”8 I then examined the pa-
tents to consider whether they used the terms in a manner that implied 
or asserted a genetic component to, or basis for, race.9 Focusing on the 
claims section was particularly significant because the claims “specif[y] 
the legally operative scope of the patent, defining the formal legal 
 
5. Id. at 743. 
6. Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and 
Racialized Medicine in a Post-Genomic Age 21, 90 (Columbia Univ. 
Press 2013). 
7. Editorial, Illuminating BiDil, 23 Nature Biotechnology 903, 903 (2005) 
(internal citation omitted).  
8. Kahn, supra note 1, at 1349–50. 
9. As I noted in the original article, this is an admittedly subjective basis for 
sorting the patents. The categorization of patents that impliedly assert a 
significant genetic component to race or ethnicity is meant to exclude those 
patents that use racial/ethnic categories as one or more of a longer list of 
general demographic characteristics, usually employed for information or-
ganization, rather than for identifying or treating a particular physiological 
state. Thus, for example, patents on cosmetic products and database man-
agement were excluded. The categorization is meant to include those patents 
that use racial/ethnic categories as a basis for asserting a distinctive pre-
valence or etiology for a physiological condition, genetic variation, and/or 
drug response. 
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boundaries of the territory covered by an invention.”10 Below are the 
results of this first search from 200611: 
Table 1. Racial and Ethnic Categories Mentioned in  
U.S. Patent Filings, 1976–200612 
Category   Issued Patents:    Patent Applications 
    1976–1997  1998–2005     filed from 2001–2005 
Race   0 2   15 
Ethnic   0 0    2 
African-American/Black 0 4   11 
Alaska Native  0 0    0 
Asian   0 0   13 
Caucasian/White  0 6   18 
Hispanic/Latino  0 0    3 
Native American  0 0    2 
Pacific Islander  0 0    1 
Total   0 12   65 
 
Already in 2006, it was striking how the use of racial categories in pa-
tents and applications had burgeoned in the aftermath of the comple-
tion of the Human Genome Project.13 The great initial irony here was 
that the post-genomic age was supposed to be a post-racial age. At a 
triumphant ceremony in 2000 announcing the completion of the first 
draft of the human genome, President Clinton declared: “I believe one 
of the great truths to emerge from this triumphant expedition inside 
the human genome is that in genetic terms, all human beings, regardless 
of race, are more than 99.9 percent the same.”14 
But as the 2006 tally of patents made clear, something else was 
going on. At least in the world of intellectual property, race seemed to 
be taking on a new and distinctive salience as a genetic marker capable 
of conferring legal and commercial advantage in the drive to develop 
 
10. Id. at 1349. 
11. Id. at 1350 tbl.1. 
12. “Issued patents” have received formal approval from the USPTO. “Patent 
applications” were pending for review before the USPTO. USPTO policies 
enable public access to pending patent applications during the review period. 
13. See id. at 1349–50 (noting a rise in using racial categories in gene-related 
patents as “clearly coincident” with the Human Genome Project).  
14. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the 
President, Prime Minister Tony Blair of England (via Satellite), Dr. Francis 
Collins, Dir. of the Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., and Dr. Craig 
Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera Genomics Corp., on 
the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project 
(June 26, 2000), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/ 
project/clinton2.shtml [https://perma.cc/DSK2-RHYA].  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
Revisiting Racial Patents in an Era of Precision Medicine 
1156 
new products for the biomedical marketplace. In the wake of BiDil’s 
approval by the FDA, language of leaving race behind was superseded 
by language of using race as a stepping-stone to reach the promised 
land of personalized medicine.15 And so patents geneticizing race con-
tinued to proliferate. 
Coming back ten years later and conducting a similar search on the 
PTO’s web site, the following results are present: 
Table 2. Racial and Ethnic Categories Mentioned in  
U.S. Patent Filings, 2006–201616 
Category   Issued Patents: Patent Applications 
        2006–2016        filed 2006–2016 
Race   3    38 
Ethnic   13    89 
African-American/Black 8    71 
Alaska Native  0     0 
Asian   8    54 
Caucasian/White  23    108 
Hispanic/Latino  1     17 
Native American  6     7 
Pacific Islander  0     0 
Total   63    384 
 
From 1998 to 2005 there were twelve uses of racial and ethnic 
categories in granted patents. Between 2006 and 2016 that number grew 
to 63. Similarly, with respect to the use of racial and ethnic categories 
in patent applications filed, the number of uses rose from 65 in the years 
between 2001 and 2005 to 384 in the years between 2006 and 2016. Far 
from abating with new genomic discoveries, the use of racial categories 
in biomedical patenting has increased aggressively. 
What we see happening here is the normalization and routinization 
of inserting racial and ethnic categories into biomedical patents over 
the past decade. At a time when, rhetorically, many scientists and 
policy makers have been asserting the irrelevance of race in genetic 
research, we see a very different story unfolding in the world of 
intellectual property. Race, it is clear, is now understood as a standard 
and acceptable means to strengthen or supplement existing patent pro-
tections, regardless of its implications for reifying race as genetic. 
 One particularly recent and typical example can be found in U.S. 
Patent No. 9,241,991, titled “Agents, Compositions, & Methods for 
 
15. Kahn, supra note 6, at 163. 
16. The search for patents and patent applications was conducted on the 
USPTO website between July 10 and July 15, 2016. 
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Treating Pruritus & Related Skin Conditions.”17 As the abstract states: 
“This invention relates generally to a therapeutic use of TLR3 and 
TLR7 inhibitors to treat or reduce pruritus in a subject.”18 TLR3 and 
TLR7 are proteins that in humans are encoded by the TLR3 and TLR7 
genes. Pruritus “is an unpleasant cutaneous sensation that evokes 
scratching behavior, which is distinct from pain that elicits withdrawal 
reflex of affected body.”19 The first (and most important) claim sets 
forth “[a] method of reducing pruritus in a subject, the method com-
prising administering to the subject a therapeutically effective amount 
of a toll-like receptor (TLR) 3 or TLR7 inhibitor, thereby reducing 
pruritus in the subject.”20 So far, so good. But then moving down near 
the end of the list we come across Claims 17–19 which state: “17. The 
method of claim 1, wherein the subject is a black African[;] 18. The 
method of claim 1, wherein the subject is a mammal[; and] 19. The 
method of claim 1, wherein the subject is a human.”21 
There are several things to note here. First, there is the qualification 
of “black” African. On the one hand, this clearly is intended to try to 
offer greater specificity than the geographic continental term “African.” 
The implication being that “black” Africans can and should be 
distinguished from non-black Africans, whether those of more recent 
European or Indian settler populations in Southern Africa who do not 
code as “black,” or those people from Northern Africa who might 
identify as Arab, Bedouin, or Berber, etc., who also do not generally 
code as “black.” This specification is similar to that of “sub-Saharan 
African” also used in some patents as a qualifying term. But whereas 
“sub-Saharan African,” while still problematic (see below), at least 
consistently uses geographic specifications for its population designator, 
“black African” mixes two taxonomies: geographic and racial. The 
patent never defines what is meant by the term “black.” Is it purely a 
phenotypic description referring to skin color? If so, one could hardly 
say that dark skinned Africans have a uniform level of melanin in their 
skin that renders them all uniformly definable as “black.” Indeed, how 
much melanin does it take to make an African into a “black” African? 
Of course, one might argue that the patent is merely employing terms 
that invoke common sense social understandings of who constitutes a 
“black African,” but where else in complex biomedical patents do we 
ever see applicants similarly relying on such ill-defined “common sense” 
understanding of technical terms that are central to delineating the 
scope of the patent? 
 
17. U.S. Patent No. 9,241,991 (filed Oct. 21, 2011). 
18. Id. at [57]. 
19. Id. at col. 1 l. 30–32. 
20. Id. at col. 69. 
21. Id. at col. 70 l. 54–59. 
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Beyond the ambiguity of the term “black African,” there is the even 
more problematic implication that this poorly defined term somehow 
has genetic salience. The patent, after all, is about administering a sub-
stance that affects gene function.22 Singling out “black Africans” for a 
distinct claim is necessarily premised on the idea that “black African” 
genes are somehow different from the genes of other racial groups. 
This leads us to the second deeper problem, the geneticization of 
race through patent law. Claim 17 specifies that the subject is a “black 
African,” and Claim 19 specifies that the subject is a “human.”23 Of 
course, black Africans are a subset of the larger group “human.” It 
would seem odd to allow a patent to cover a subset of a larger group, 
and indeed, the doctrine of “double patenting” would seem to prohibit 
such uses. Among other things, this doctrine prevents essentially claim-
ing the same subject matter twice in different ways.24 The contrast 
between Claim 18, where the subject is a “mammal” and Claim 17 
where the subject is a “black African” is instructive here. Making 
separate claims for using the invention in a “human” and a “mammal” 
would not be double patenting, even though the category “mammal” 
entirely contains the category “human,” because the category 
“mammal” also contains animals that are physiologically and geneti-
cally distinct from humans. Therefore, it would not be obvious that a 
therapeutic agent would work in other mammals as well as in humans. 
In contrast, one cannot claim with any scientific rigor that “black 
Africans” are physiologically or genetically distinct from other 
“humans” such that it would not be obvious that the therapeutic agent 
would not work in all humans if it worked in black Africans. That is, 
given the essential genetic unity of the human race and that “[p]ooling 
people in race silos is akin to zoologists grouping raccoons, tigers and 
okapis on the basis that they are all stripey,”25 singling out “black 
Africans” for a claim distinct from “human” simply makes no sense. 
And yet, the patent office saw no apparent problem here. The under-
lying logic of accepting the separate black African claim can only be 
that the patent office consider that as human is to mammal so too is 
black African to human—or human:mammal ~ black African:human. 
The implication here is that, in the face of all scientific evidence to the 
contrary, the PTO has sanctioned the idea that in the larger category 
of “human” there are subjects who are physiologically and genetically 
distinct from “black Africans.” So much for the genetic unity of human 
kind. 
 
22. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
23. Id. 
24. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examin-
ing Procedure § 804 (2015) (defining double patenting). 
25. Illuminating BiDil, supra note 7, at 903. 
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Ironically, this makes sense considering that to reach this decision, 
the PTO first had to accept the (mistaken) “common sense” idea that 
“black African” is an obvious category in no further need of definition. 
From there, it is a short step to unquestioningly accepting the further 
(mistaken) “common sense” idea that there is a genetic basis to race. 
In short, when it comes to race, the PTO (like many patent applicants) 
effectively throws out scientific rigor in favor of common sense social 
understandings of race. 
To some extent the PTO itself has been complicit in promoting this 
dynamic. As I have noted in earlier work, in December 2008, at a 
quarterly meeting of the PTO’s Biotechnology, Chemical and 
Pharmaceuticals (BCP) technology groups’ “customer partnership,” 
PTO quality assurance specialist, Kathleen Bragdon, gave a presen-
tation on “Personalized Medicine” in which she suggested that the PTO 
would likely require the inclusion of race specific data in certain patent 
filings using genetic correlation studies because the PTO considered 
ethnicity to be an “unpredictable factor” in such studies.26 Presumably 
the idea here was that certain genetic variations, or alleles, have been 
observed to occur at different frequencies in different ethnic groups. 
What Bragdon failed to consider was that ethnicity itself was not an 
unpredictable factor but rather was an “unpredictable art”—that is, 
the means by which ethnicity itself is constructed and applied are often 
vague and variable —and certainly rarely defined in biomedical patent 
applications. 
Typically, patent applications employ such overbroad, outdated 
nineteenth century categories as “African,” “Caucasian,” and “Asian” 
without offering any substantive definition of what they mean by those 
terms. Sometimes, they may go so far as to state that a term such as 
“African” means someone having “origins” or “ancestry” from Africa or 
perhaps even “sub-saharan Africa”—but of course does not consider the 
fact that if we go back far enough we all have origins in sub-saharan 
Africa, or that if we only go back a few hundred years there are 
substantial “African” populations with recent ties to parts of Europe 
and Asia—populations are not static, and so neither are genes.27 Yet, 
instead of requiring patent applicants to better define the racial or 
ethnic categories they employ, Bragdon intimated that they should use 
these same imprecise categories more—indeed as a matter of routine. 
While the PTO later walked back these comments somewhat, replacing 
the word “ethnicity” with “patient populations”28—the message and 
general orientation of the PTO remains clear, and is born out in the 
 
26. Kahn, supra note 6, at 141–48. 
27. See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, ‘When Are You From?’ Time, Space, and Capital 
in the Molecular Reinscription of Race, 66 Brit. J. of Soc. 68, 70 (2015) 
(discussing how all ancestry is shared). 
28. Kahn, supra note 6, at 142–43. 
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evident continued rise in the use of racial and ethnic categories not only 
in applications, but in granted patents as well. 
It is now clear that patenting race has become a routine, nor-
malized, and even incentivized practice in biomedicine. Whether indi-
vidual scientists particularly wish to include race in any given patent 
application, it is clear that their technology transfer offices and patent 
attorneys do. We may be touting the coming age of precision medicine, 
but there is nothing “precise” about how these patent applicants use 
racial categories in their filings—or for that matter in much of the 
underlying research.29 
It does not have to be this way. There are some rare examples 
where PTO patent examiners have questioned how race was being used 
in particular patents, and there is an excellent example from the 
European Patent Office (EPO) of some more thoughtful and productive 
ways to think about race in the patenting process. 
First, the PTO examples. There are several examples where initial 
patent applications included racial categories but the final granted 
applications had no such references. For the most part, when reviewing 
relevant patent prosecution documents exchanged between applicant 
and patent examiner, it is unclear why the race-specific claims were 
ultimately dropped. Often, it appears that the race-specific claims were 
merely casualties of the common process of give-and-take between any 
patent applicant and examiner where the examiner is arguing that the 
patent actually states claims for more than one specific invention and 
so requires the applicant to make an “election” among claims to make 
sure that the final patent is coherent and limited to one particular 
invention.30 In this process, the race-specific claims, which are often 
ancillary to the central claims of the patent, tend to go by the wayside.31 
 
29. See, e.g., Catherine Bliss, Race Decoded: The Genomic Fight for 
Social Justice (2012) (examining a shift to race-conscious research in 
various sciences); Ann Morning, The Nature of Race: How Scien-
tists Think and Teach About Human Difference (2011) (exploring 
different conceptions of race). 
30. See, e.g., Kenneth Horton, How to Deal with Restriction Requirements in 
Patent Applications, Inside Counsel (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www. 
insidecounsel.com/2015/02/05/how-to-deal-with-restriction-requirements-in-
paten [https://perma.cc/WH99-H67D] (discussing the election of species 
requirement). 
31. Examples include U.S. Patent Application No. 12/785,060, ultimately 
granted as U.S. Patent No. 8,535,887. The application specified a claim “[a] 
method for estimating a probability that a patient having a chronic HCV 
genotype I infection will achieve a sustained viral response to combination 
therapy with a pegylated IFN-α--2 and ribavirin . . . wherein the patient is 
self-identified as African American or Caucasian . . . .” U.S Patent 
Application No. 12/785,060 claim 19. The final patent contained no such 
racial references. ‘887 Patent. Similar changes are evident in Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms Associated with Renal Disease, U.S. Patent 
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In one case, however, patent examiner Juliet Switzer rejected two 
claims using the terms “African-American” and “Caucasian” for being 
“indefinite.”32 Here the underlying operative Claim 35 covered “[a] met-
hod for identifying susceptibility to cardiovascular disease in a subject, 
comprising: obtaining a sample from a human subject; and determining 
if the sample contains a risk allele of ACE-associated SNPs rs4290, 
rs7214530, rs7213516 or combinations thereof.”33 The subsequent race-
specific claims asserted, “[t]he method of claim 35 wherein the subject 
is an African-American human male or female,” and “[t]he method of 
claim 35, wherein the subject is a Caucasian human male or female.”34 
In response, the applicant struck the race-specific claims and the final 
patent as issued contained no claims referencing race.35 
Switzer’s rejection of racial categories as “indefinite” occurred in 
2012—four years after Bragdon’s presentation urging the use of racial 
categories in biomedical patents. So clearly, since that time some space 
has opened up in the patent review process for more nuanced and 
critical conceptions of how to deploy race in patenting. Yet, as an 
institution, the policy of the PTO toward the use of racial categories in 
biomedical patents has not been formalized. It lacks coherence and 
seems to vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular ex-
aminer involved. 
Thus, for example, in his review of Patent Application No. 
12/867,680, “Susceptibility Variants for Lung Cancer,” examiner 
Joseph Dauner initially challenged a claim asserting a method of iden-
tifying a susceptibility gene “wherein the individual is of an ancestry 
that includes Caucasian ancestry,”36 stating that “[t]his ethnic group is 
considered indefinite because it is not clearly defined in the specification 
and there is no art recognized definition for the group.”37 Here, however, 
the applicant, the Icelandic firm Decode Genetics, pushed back. It 
 
Application No. 12/864,218, granted as U.S. Patent No. 9,102,983; Vaccine 
Peptide Combinations Against Cat Allergy, U.S. Patent Application No. 
12/602,313, granted as U.S. Patent No. 8,551,492; and Methods & Drug 
Products for Treating Alzheimer’s Disease, U.S. Patent Application No. 
13/346,081 granted as U.S. Patent No. 9,102,666.  
32. Juliet Switzer, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Office Action 
Summary: U.S. Patent Application No. 12/598,265, at 4 (Mar. 23, 
2012). 
33. U.S. Patent Application No. 12/598,265 claim 35 (filed Apr. 30, 2008). 
34. Id. at cl. 36–37. 
35. Polymorphisms in Genes Affecting ACE-Related Disorders & Uses Thereof, 
U.S. Patent No. 9,012,143 (issued Apr. 21, 2015).  
36. U.S. Patent Application No. 12/867,680 claim 16.  
37. Joseph G. Dauner, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Office 
Action Summary: U.S. Patent Application No. 12/867,680, at 16 
(Jan. 19, 2012). 
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amended the claim by adding that “Caucasian ancestry is determined 
by self-reporting,” and asserting that this was “a standard approach 
used by scientists in the field and recommended by the FDA (see 
Exhibit 1, e.g. at p. 4).”38 The FDA document referenced here was a 
2005 “Guidance for Industry: Collection of Race and Ethnicity Data in 
Clinical Trials.”39 The section on pages 4–5 referenced by Decode 
Genetics states: “We [the FDA] recommend that study participants 
self-report race and ethnicity information whenever feasible, and that 
individuals be permitted to designate a multiracial identity.”40 Satisfied 
by this response, Examiner Dauner withdrew his indefiniteness objec-
tion and the race-specific claim was allowed to stand.41 
Here is a classic example of “mission creep,” whereby an FDA 
regulatory guidance intended to promote the collection of racial and 
ethnic data in drug trials was referenced to support a very different and 
much more explicitly geneticized use of racial categories before a 
different regulatory agency, (the PTO), for a very different purpose, 
(patent protection). Significantly, Decode Genetics, in referencing the 
FDA Guidance, did not draw attention to its very important caveat 
that these racial categories comported with those promulgated by the 
Office of Management and Budget for use in such data collection en-
deavors as the Census, and that “[t]he OMB stated that its race and 
ethnicity categories were not anthropologic or scientifically based desig-
nations, but instead were categories that described the sociocultural 
construct of our society.”42 The FDA allowed for self-reporting of race 
while recognizing that such usages were social, not genetic, in character. 
In its patent application, however, Decode was clearly and directly 
using the category “Caucasian” as specifically and explicitly of genetic 
significance. Decode used the reference to the FDA, a coordinate federal 
agency, as authority for its claim. This apparently was sufficient for 
Dauner who withdrew his objection. Yet nowhere was the point made 
that self-identification as “Caucasian” has no proven relevance to 
establishing anything about the genetic profile of any given individual. 
 
38. Reply to Office Action of Jan. 19, 2012 at 18, U.S. Patent Application No. 
12/867,680 (July 12, 2012). 
39. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Food & Drug Admin., 
Guidance for Industry: Collection of Race and Ethnicity Data 
in Clinical Trials (2005), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr/ 
2002d-0018-gdl0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y4S-E3GT].  
40. Id. at 4–5. 
41. Dauner, supra note 37, at 2. Ultimately, the race-specific claim was deleted 
based on an independent technical objection that it stated an “improper 
Markush grouping of alternatives,” meaning that the claims “do not share a 
substantial feature and/or common function/use that flows from the 
substantial structural feature” of the patent. Id. at 16. 
42. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 39, at 3. 
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Again, such an approach is about as scientifically rigorous as grouping 
raccoons, tigers, and okapis on the basis that they are all stripey. 
To get a full sense of the contingency of using race in biomedical 
patents, it is useful to compare how the PTO and the EPO handled the 
same patent application for “[t]reatment of hepatitis C in the Asian 
population with subcutaneous interferon beta.”43 The PTO ultimately 
granted the race-specific patent while the EPO rejected it for 
inadequately defining “Asian population.”44 The story of how each office 
reached its conclusion is a study in contrasts, revealing the possibilities 
for more rigorous and nuanced examinations of the use of race in 
patenting. 
First, the PTO story. Originally filed in 2003 and assigned to Merck 
Serono S.A., the patent application related “to the use of recombinant 
IFN-beta for the production of a medicament for the treatment of HCV 
[hepatitis C virus] infection by subcutaneous administration to patients 
of Asian race, which failed to respond to a previous treatment with 
interferon-alpha . . . .”45 This race-specific focus was based largely on 
studies conducted in Japan and Taiwan that observed “differences 
between patients of Asian and non-Asian origin” in response to IFN-
Beta treatments for HCV.46 Unlike many such applications, this one 
actually endeavored to define the concepts of “race” and “Asian” as 
used on the application. Its assertions in these areas, however, are 
hardly reassuring. It begins by specifying that: 
According to the present invention ‘a race’ is a population that 
can be distinguished as a distinct subgroup within a species (e.g. 
the human species). A race possesses a unique and distinct en-
semble of genes, and is identified by the traits (both mental and 
physical) produced by the genetic ensemble. Members of the same 
race share distinguishing genetic characteristics, because they 
share a common genetic ancestry and a consequently similar gen-
etic ensemble.47 
The assertion here that human races are genetically distinctive entities 
is deeply problematic, even dangerous in the way it geneticizes race. 
Two years before this patent was filed, an editorial in Nature Genetics 
clearly stated that “scientists have long been saying that at the genetic 
level there is more variation between two individuals in the same 
population than between populations and that there is no biological 
 
43. European Patent Application No. 03755981.2; U.S. Patent No. 7,344,709 
(issued Mar. 18, 2008). 
44. Merck Serono SA, Decision T 1845/11, at 1 (Tech. Bd. App. 2015). 
45. ‘709 Patent, supra note 43, at [57]. 
46. Id. at col. 3 l. 10–13, 43–47. 
47. Id. at col. 8 l. 12–20 (emphasis added). 
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basis for ‘race.’”48 This had been the scientific consensus for decades. 
At least since Richard Lewontin’s ground-breaking work on blood group 
polymorphisms in different groups and races in the 1970s,49 scientists 
had understood that race would statistically explain only an exceedingly 
small portion of genetic variation. 
Yet, the patent goes on to cite the work of another renowned 
geneticist, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, asserting that based on his “nuclear 
DNA studies . . . at least 6 human races/populations can be defined: 
the Caucasoid (which include the European and Indian populations), 
the African, the Asian, the Arctic, the American Indian, and the Pacific 
one.”50 Following this citation, the patent goes on to assert: “According 
to the present invention ‘Asian’ means any person having origins in any 
of the original peoples of China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, 
Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Philippines.”51 
On the one hand, it is notable, even laudable, that the patent 
applicants actually tried to define “race” and “Asian.” Most do not. 
Yet it must be noted that the citation used to support their claim is to 
a popular science magazine article, not a peer reviewed scientific 
journal. Moreover, the article cited here makes no direct reference at 
all to defining six distinct human races/populations, let alone their 
particular characterization of the category “Asian.” The patent app-
ears, rather, to be referring to a graphic in the article, which was titled 
Genes, Peoples and Languages, that specifies “Caucasoid,” “African,” 
“Mainland Asian,” “Arctic,” “American,” and “Pacific” but that is 
further divided into sixteen additional population subgroups without 
any direct reference to genetics.52 As the article progresses, we see that 
it is actually grounded on Cavalli-Sforza’s 1988 study of the evolu-
tionary origins of no fewer than “42 world populations.”53 Hardly the 
distinctive six races asserted in the patent. In fact, Cavalli-Sforza states 
clearly at the outset of the article that: 
Human populations are sometimes known as ethnic groups, or 
‘races,’ if one likes, although racist misuse of the term has made 
it rather odious. They are hard to define in a way that is both 
rigorous and useful because human beings group themselves in a 
 
48. Genes, Drugs and Race, 29 Nature Genetics 239, 239 (2001). 
49. Richard C. Lewontin, The Apportionment of Human Diversity, 6 Evolu-
tionary Biology 381, 397 (1972). 
50. ‘709 Patent, supra note 43, at col. 8 l. 21–26. 
51. Id. at col. 8 l. 27–31. 
52. Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, Peoples and Languages, Sci. Am., Nov. 
1991, at 104–05. 
53. Id. at 109. 
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bewildering array of sets, some of them overlapping, all of them 
in a state of flux. Languages, however, gave us a little help.54 
As the article progresses, Cavalli-Sforza emphasizes that his study 
focused on “aboriginal populations . . . that occupied their present 
territories before the great migratory waves that followed the voyages 
of discovery in the Renaissance.”55 He goes on to clearly state that 
“[d]istances between these aboriginal groups cannot be abstracted from 
the presence or absence of a single inherited trait, or the gene that 
expresses it, because each group carries practically all the extant human 
genes. What does vary is the frequency with which the genes appear.”56 
So, Cavalli-Sforza’s article does not assert that there are six distinct, 
genetically bounded races. It focuses on particular aboriginal groups 
and even then clearly asserts that “each group carries practically all the 
extant human genes.”57 The only thing that varies is the frequency with 
which certain genes appear. Nonetheless, this is the article that the 
patent applicant cites to support its assertion that the category “Asian” 
constitutes “[a] race [that] possesses a unique and distinct ensemble of 
genes . . . .”58 
Yet, somehow, the U.S. patent examiner found the reference to 
Cavalli-Sforza sufficient and the race-specific claims of the patent were 
never challenged. Perhaps because the applicant actually took the 
trouble to define “race,” the issue of its meaning or the clarity of the 
term “Asian” never even came up during the patent examination 
process.59 And so, the race specific patent issued without objection from 
the PTO in 2008.60 
The very same patent application filed before the EPO received 
very different treatment—specifically with reference to its use of race. 
In this case, the EPO patent examiner denied the race-specific claim 
and Merck Serono appealed to the EPO’s Technical Board of Appeal.61 
In its 2015 decision, the Board noted that “[t]he sole ground for the 
refusal” by the patent examining division was that “the present appli-
cation does not clearly define ‘Asian race.’”62 In reaching this determi-
nation, the Board referenced numerous scientific sources, including the 
 
54. Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. ‘709 Patent, supra note 43, at col. 8 l. 14–15. 
59. Id. at col. 8 l. 12–20.  
60. Id. at [45].  
61. Merck Serono SA, Decision T 1845/11, at 1 (Tech. Bd. App. 2015). 
62. Id. 
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original Cavalli-Sforza article in Scientific American cited in the patent 
application.63 Notably, it also cited the 2000 Nature Genetics editorial 
questioning the use of racial categories in biomedical contexts.64 
As summarized by the Board of Appeal, Merck Serono’s primary 
arguments were grounded on assertions that “[c]lassifications by race 
were routinely made in clinical trials and used by regulatory authorities 
like the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA),” and “[t]hat self-identification was routinely 
used in clinical trials . . . .”65 It further asserted that “[t]he term ‘Asian 
race’ was not only clear by itself, but was also fully described in the 
application, which . . . gave a definition of the term ‘Asian’ as well as 
guidance on how the race assignment could be done.”66 The reference 
to other regulatory authorities such as the EMEA and the FDA is 
particularly notable, especially because it references the same FDA 
Guidance on Collection of Racial and Ethnic Data in Clinical Trials 
that Decode Genetics successfully used to overcome PTO objections to 
the use of racial categories in its Patent Application No. 12/867,680, 
“Susceptibility Variants for Lung Cancer,” discussed above.67 
In this case, however, the EPO Board of Appeal took a much closer 
and more sophisticated look at the claims before it. Setting forth the 
standard of review, the decision states: “For the clarity requirement of 
Article 84 EPC to be met, the skilled person who reads the claim 
against the background of his common general knowledge must be able 
to unambiguously distinguish patients which belong to the Asian race 
from those which do not.”68 The decision concluded that merely refer-
encing other regulatory agencies was insufficient if these agencies them-
selves did not provide definitions of sufficient rigor to meet the require-
ments of defining “Asian” for the purposes of the patent application.69 
It further notes that “[t]he claim itself does not provide a definition of 
the term ‘Asian race’, or any indication of the parameters to be used 
for assigning a patient to the Asian race”; therefore, “[t]he question to 
be decided is . . . whether or not there exists a clear i.e. unequivocal 
and generally accepted meaning for the term ‘Asian race.’”70 
 
63. Id. at 1–3 (citing Cavalli-Sforza, supra note 52). 
64. Id. at 6–7 (citing Census, Race and Science, 24 Nature Genetics 97 
(2000)).  
65. Id. at 3–4.  
66. Id. at 4. 
67. Id. at 2; see supra text accompanying notes 36–41 (discussing patent 
applicant’s reliance on FDA regulatory guidance). 
68. Id. at 5. 
69. Id. at 8–9.  
70. Id. at 6. 
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Of course, the separate “specifications” section of the patent did 
include the definition of “Asian” as meaning “any person having origins 
in any of the original peoples of China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Philippines.”71 The Board, however, insightfully notes 
that: 
The expression “having origins” . . . neither excludes mixed ori-
gins nor in particular limits the degree of separation from the 
ancestor providing those origins. Indeed, it would appear that all 
Europeans have “origins” in the “original peoples” of Asia . . . . 
However, Europeans are not normally considered to belong to the 
“Asian race”.72 
Therefore, the Board concludes that “the use of the feature ‘having 
origins’ without properly defining the circumstances in which a patient 
is to be regarded as having those origins gives rise to ambiguity in the 
definition of ‘Asian race’ provided by the description.”73 
The Board’s decision also discusses at length the 2000 Nature 
Genetics editorial (cited as “document D19”) noting that it discloses: 
That issues of, for example, race are, “often associated with poorly 
defined lay terminology,” and that “this is not just a matter of 
sloppy language, but reflects the imprecise use of racial and ethnic 
classification in biomedical research.” It is therefore concluded in 
document D19 . . . that “there is no justification, however, to use 
race as a substitute for other parameters that can be measured, 
such as genetic variation or differences in metabolism” and “the 
laudable objective to find means to improve the health conditions 
for all or for specific populations must not be compromised by the 
use of race or ethnicity as pseudo-biological variables.”74 
The decision then goes on to quote two additional peer-reviewed scien-
tific articles, noting that “[a]cross all disciplines present, it was agreed 
that the biologic concept of race is no longer tenable and that race 
should no longer be considered a valid biological classification”;75 and 
that “the use of the terms race and ethnicity [ . . . ] can at times be 
 
71. Id. at 11.  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 11–12.  
74. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting Census, Race and Science, 24 Nature 
Genetics 97, 98 (2000)). 
75. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Harold P. Freeman, The Meaning of Race in 
Science—Considerations for Cancer Research: Concerns of Special 
Populations in the National Cancer Program, 82 Cancer 219, 220 (1998)). 
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troublesome because of the impreciseness of the definitions, the his-
torical implications of the words, and the lack of any scientific basis for 
their meaning . . . .”76 With this close reading of the relevant literature 
in hand, the Board ultimately concluded that “at the priority date of 
the present application [2002] the term ‘race,’ and hence also the term 
‘Asian race,’ had no unequivocal and generally accepted meaning for 
the skilled person. Accordingly, he could also not determine without 
ambiguity whether or not a patient belonged to the ‘Asian race.’”77 
This decision is truly remarkable in several respects. It indepen-
dently examines the concept of race as discussed in relevant literature. 
While not engaging with the extensive social science literature on racial 
classification, it does not simply roll over, as did the U.S. patent exam-
iner, in the face of a superficial reference to the Cavalli-Sforza article. 
This implies, but admittedly does not definitively establish, that 
the EPO Board of Appeal had a very different underlying common-
sense conception of the nature of race than did the U.S. examiner. As 
is made clear by the increasing proliferation of racial patents in the 
United States, most patent examiners—and the PTO in general—can 
be understood to largely have an underlying presumption that race is, 
indeed, genetic, scientific evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. 
This explains the readiness of most patent examiners to unquestioningly 
accept the use of racial categories in biomedical patents. 
As noted above, there are exceptions. But in many respects these 
exceptions prove the rule, particularly as in the case of Patent 
Application No. 12/867,680, “Susceptibility Variants for Lung Cancer,” 
where examiner Joseph Dauner withdrew his initial objection after the 
applicant merely referenced the FDA Guidance on Collecting Racial 
and Ethnic Data in Clinical Trials.78 In striking contrast, the EPO, 
when similarly presented with a reference to the FDA Guidance, placed 
it in a much broader context of other scientific discussions of race and 
genetics and came to its own conclusion that the Guidance alone did 
not sufficiently address its concerns about adequately defining racial 
categories. The readiness of Dauner to withdraw his objection evidences 
a readiness to accept—and to perhaps confirm—a basic understanding 
of race as genetic. In contrast, the EPO Board’s response to the gui-
dance, like its response to the Cavalli-Sforza article, was to place it in 
a larger context and make an independent evaluation of the adequacy 
of the definition it provided. It clearly does not presume a basic under-
lying genetic basis for race. 
 
76. Id. at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Frederick P. Rivara & Laurence Finberg, 
Editorial, Use of the Terms Race and Ethnicity, 155 Archives of Pediatric 
& Adolescent Med. 119, 119 (2001)). 
77. Id. 
78. Dauner, supra note 37, at 2. 
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Conclusion 
As we move into a purported era of “precision medicine,” it be-
hooves us to consider where race stands as a category of scientific, legal, 
and commercial interest. Just as the election of Donald Trump to the 
presidency has driven home to many that we do not live in a post-racial 
era politically, so too does the continuing proliferation of racial patents 
indicate that we are also not in a post-racial era scientifically. Yet, it is 
important to understand that the persistence of race in biomedical pa-
tents is neither inevitable nor straightforward. As seen from the several 
examples examined in depth here, the geneticization of race through 
the patent process remains a relatively contingent and contested phe-
nomenon. As shown in this Article, patent examiners’ responses to the 
use of racial categories in biomedical patents have varied widely. While 
in the majority of cases the use of race is not challenged, there are 
exceptions. Sometimes initial objections have been overcome by simple 
references to other regulatory authorities, such as the FDA, which 
appear to be unquestioningly accepted as sufficient to overcome objec-
tions. In other cases, a clearly stated objection to the indefiniteness of 
racial terms has been sufficient to compel an applicant to retreat and 
withdraw the racial claims. Most powerfully, there stands the example 
of the EPO, where the examiners undertook an independent review of 
the literature to critically consider the validity and clarity of racial 
claims. It is this final example that stands as a beacon to guide future 
approaches to evaluating race-specific claims in future patents. Let 
applicants submit such claims, but let them be warned that they must 
make clear showings of the validity and clarity of their definitions 
sufficient to overcome the sorts of objections raised by the EPO in its 
review of the patent for “Treatment of hepatitis C in the Asian pop-
ulation with subcutaneous interferon beta.”79 Though not ideal in all 
respects, this sort of independent, critically minded review provides a 
clear and easy-to-follow model of how to begin to approach the review 
of applications that mix racial and genetic categories to augment legal 
protection for their biomedical inventions. 
 
79. Merck Serono SA, Decision T 1845/11 (Tech. Bd. App. 2015). 
